I like POGO; they do an excellent job of being factual, of using the original / primary source documents, and they reveal a lot of what is wrong with our government, keeping it both more transparent and more honest. We need more of that, but to be of any use, we also need more people who demand the truth, and fewer who blindly follow ideology.
POGO doesn't curry the favor of anyone, they don't seek campaign contributions or PAC support to get elected to any office. They simply pursue the truth where the objective reality - the facts - show something is badly wrong.
They do that again here. I've broken their report down to 4 sections, to make it easier to navigate the length of their findings. You might also want to look at the earlier Penigma posts on the very serious problems that have beset the supposed elite F-22. Enjoy!
From POGO:
A report by the Department of Defense Inspector General concluded that the Defense Security Service whistleblower was retaliated against and that his concerns about Boeing were reasonable. Click here to view an annotated version of the report.
A previously nonpublic Defense Department (DoD) Inspector General (IG) report obtained by POGO raises questions about the government's effectiveness in overseeing the security of classified material in the hands of defense contractors.
The DoD IG report centers on one government agent's quest to find the truth about the storage of classified information at Boeing—the second largest defense contractor—and the retaliation that the agent said he endured as a result. The DoD IG report raises questions about how well the Boeing Company is protecting classified weapons design information in its possession.
The vast outsourcing of many of the nation’s most classified defense projects to government contractors creates unique problems because the information is out of the government’s hands. Enter the Defense Security Service, the little-known U.S. agency tasked with ensuring that contractors—for the military services and dozens of federal agencies—properly safeguard classified information in their possession.
The threat to these assets is very real. Foreign attempts to illegally gain access to sensitive or classified information more than doubled from fiscal years 2009 to 2010, according to the latest annual counterintelligence trend analysis by the Defense Security Service.
As attempted incidents of cyber mayhem are on the rise, the role of the Defense Security Service as the key overseer of the nation’s most delicate security secrets is more important than ever. However, the Service has for years come under fire from congressional investigators and the Pentagon’s Inspector General for its lackluster oversight of contractors.
In 2002, Robert Conley, an industrial security specialist with the Defense Security Service, began to investigate what he believed was an illegal “classified technology library” in Boeing’s secretive Phantom Works division that was in alleged violation of regulations on protection of classified information.
Conley alleged to the DoD IG that after he continued to raise concerns about the problems he found at Boeing, his supervisors retaliated against him and publicly humiliated him. The April 2011 report by the DoD IG Civilian Reprisal Investigations unit substantiated Conley’s allegation that Defense Security Service management reprised against him. One act of reprisal, for example, “was significant because it resulted in loss of prestige, loss of opportunity for promotion, and loss of complex and challenging work.” The report also determined that “Mr. Conley's belief, in 2002, that Boeing was illegally transferring classified technology was reasonable.”
The Marine Corps official responsible for the program’s security, Randall Kelly, asked Conley to ensure that Boeing returned all relevant classified materials it had received in order to carry out its duties. Conley and Kelly performed an inspection and “discovered that pieces of classified material were missing,” according to the IG report obtained by POGO, and Conley opened an administrative inquiry into the matter. “As a result of this inquiry, Mr. Conley stated that he discovered the missing classified material in other SAP [special access program] compartments,” the IG report noted.
More significantly, the report states that Conley said he “discovered the existence of a classified technology library ‘that had grown in scope beyond the legal bounds’” imposed by the Air Force, which originally created the library. For roughly the next three months, Conley investigated what Boeing was doing by interviewing Boeing employees and examining documents.
POGO doesn't curry the favor of anyone, they don't seek campaign contributions or PAC support to get elected to any office. They simply pursue the truth where the objective reality - the facts - show something is badly wrong.
They do that again here. I've broken their report down to 4 sections, to make it easier to navigate the length of their findings. You might also want to look at the earlier Penigma posts on the very serious problems that have beset the supposed elite F-22. Enjoy!
From POGO:
Whistleblower: Boeing Put Classified Information at Risk
Pentagon Watchdog Backs Up Retaliation Claim
By NICK SCHWELLENBACH
A previously nonpublic Defense Department (DoD) Inspector General (IG) report obtained by POGO raises questions about the government's effectiveness in overseeing the security of classified material in the hands of defense contractors.
The DoD IG report centers on one government agent's quest to find the truth about the storage of classified information at Boeing—the second largest defense contractor—and the retaliation that the agent said he endured as a result. The DoD IG report raises questions about how well the Boeing Company is protecting classified weapons design information in its possession.
The vast outsourcing of many of the nation’s most classified defense projects to government contractors creates unique problems because the information is out of the government’s hands. Enter the Defense Security Service, the little-known U.S. agency tasked with ensuring that contractors—for the military services and dozens of federal agencies—properly safeguard classified information in their possession.
The threat to these assets is very real. Foreign attempts to illegally gain access to sensitive or classified information more than doubled from fiscal years 2009 to 2010, according to the latest annual counterintelligence trend analysis by the Defense Security Service.
As attempted incidents of cyber mayhem are on the rise, the role of the Defense Security Service as the key overseer of the nation’s most delicate security secrets is more important than ever. However, the Service has for years come under fire from congressional investigators and the Pentagon’s Inspector General for its lackluster oversight of contractors.
In 2002, Robert Conley, an industrial security specialist with the Defense Security Service, began to investigate what he believed was an illegal “classified technology library” in Boeing’s secretive Phantom Works division that was in alleged violation of regulations on protection of classified information.
Conley alleged to the DoD IG that after he continued to raise concerns about the problems he found at Boeing, his supervisors retaliated against him and publicly humiliated him. The April 2011 report by the DoD IG Civilian Reprisal Investigations unit substantiated Conley’s allegation that Defense Security Service management reprised against him. One act of reprisal, for example, “was significant because it resulted in loss of prestige, loss of opportunity for promotion, and loss of complex and challenging work.” The report also determined that “Mr. Conley's belief, in 2002, that Boeing was illegally transferring classified technology was reasonable.”
As outlined in the IG report, Conley’s investigation of Boeing began when he was wrapping up a subcontract the firm had with General Dynamics on a Marine Corps vehicle program involving “low-observable and counter-low-observable advanced technology”; in other words, highly classified ways of avoiding enemy detection or detecting potentially stealthy enemies. The program was a special access program. Special access programs are among the most highly secretive programs in the federal government and require special security measures.
Boeing's Phantom Works division works on some of the company's most advanced and sensitive projects for the U.S. government. The X-45A, pictured here, is a concept demonstrator for the next generation of unmanned combat aircraft. Photo via Flickr user JohnE777 (link).
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More significantly, the report states that Conley said he “discovered the existence of a classified technology library ‘that had grown in scope beyond the legal bounds’” imposed by the Air Force, which originally created the library. For roughly the next three months, Conley investigated what Boeing was doing by interviewing Boeing employees and examining documents.
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